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Ex-Offenders, Criminal Background Checks,
and Racial Consequences in the
Labor Market
Michael A. Stolt

I. INTRODUCTION

One of the dramatic social transformations in the United
States over the past two decades has been the rapid rise in the
prison population. Between 1980 and 2000, the U.S. prison population increased four-fold from 300 thousand to over 1.2 million.1
Including those in local jails, over 2 million individuals are currently incarcerated. 2 At these rates, the Bureau of Justice Statistics ("BJS") estimates that approximately 9 percent of all men
will serve some time in state or federal prisons. 3 Within certain
sub-groups of the population, the proportion that is likely to
serve time is quite large. For example, nearly 30 percent of African American men and 16 percent of Hispanic men will serve a
4
prison sentence at some point in their lives.
Given that the median time served for prisoners released
during the late 1990s was a little over two years, 5 a large minority of non-institutionalized men now have records of having
served time in state or federal prisons. Previous estimates for
t Professor of Public Policy, School of Public Affairs, University of California, Los
Angeles.
1 Ann L. Pastore and Kathleen Maguire, eds, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Table 6.1.2006, available at <http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t612006.pdf>
(last visited Mar 18, 2009) and Table 6.28.2006, available at <http://www.albany.edul
sourcebook/pdf/t6282006.pdf> (last visited Mar 18, 2009).
2 Id.

3 Thomas P. Bonzcar and Allen J. Beck, US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, Lifetime Likelihood of Going to State or Federal Prison,
NCJ160092, 1 (1997), available at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/llgsfp.pdf> (last
visited Mar 18, 2009).
4 Id at 2.

5 Matthew R. Durose and Patrick A. Langan, US Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics Bulletin, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2000, NCJ 198821, 4-5
(2003), available at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fssc00.pdf> (last visited Mar 18,
2009).
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1999 indicate that the total stock of the unemployed who are
former felons at any point in time is about 3 to 4 percent of the
labor force, while former prisoners represent about 1.5 to 2 percent of the labor force as a whole. 6 Though there are no precise
estimates, former felons are also likely to be disproportionately
employed or seeking work in the low wage labor market because
a disproportionate share have limited education, as measured by
7
less than a high school degree.
The successful reintegration of this growing ex-offender population is a key policy concern, since failed attempts at reintegration are likely to be costly in terms of increased crime and criminal victimization in society, increased stress on limited government resources, and lost productivity.8 Employment is one major
avenue to enhance the successful reintegration of this group.
There are several reasons to suspect that serving time in
prison may reduce ex-offenders' future employment prospects. Of
course, ex-offenders' low education, poor cognitive skills, and
other personal factors are likely to restrict employment opportunities even without considering their incarceration. Still, exoffenders may be disadvantaged in the labor market because
they do not accumulate work experience while incarcerated, and
may instead experience an erosion of skills. Furthermore, any
ties to legitimate employers are likely to be severed by an initial
arrest and by a prison spell. From the viewpoint of employers, a
criminal record may signal an untrustworthy or otherwise problematic employee. Employers may avoid such workers due to a
perceived increased propensity to break rules, steal, or harm customers, or because they fear negligent hiring lawsuits. 9
One tool that employers can use to act on their aversion to
hiring ex-offenders is the criminal background check. Employers'
6 Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael, and Michael A. Stoll, Will Employers Hire Former Offenders? Employer Preferences, Background Checks, and Their Determinants, in
Mary Pattillo, David Weiman, and Bruce Western, eds, ImprisoningAmerica: The Social
Effects of Mass Incarceration205, 234 (Russell Sage 2004).
7 See Caroline Wolf Harlow, US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics
Special Report, Education and CorrectionalPopulations, NCJ 195670 (2003), available at
<http://www.ojp.govlbjs/pub/pdflecp.pdf> (last visited Mar 18, 2009).
8 Harry J. Holzer, Collateral Costs: Effect of Incarcerationon Employment and Earnings Among Young Workers, in Steven Raphael and Michael A. Stoll, eds, Do Prisons
Make Us Safer? The Benefits and Costs of the Prison Boom 239, 268 (Russell Sage 2009).
9 Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael, and Michael A. Stoll, The Effect of an Applicant's
Criminal History on Employer Hiring Decisions and Screening Practices: Evidence from
Los Angeles, in Shawn Bushway, Michael A. Stoll, and David F. Weiman, eds, Barriersto
Reentry? The Labor Market for Released Prisoners in Post-IndustrialAmerica 117, 118
(Russell Sage 2007).
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use of criminal background checks has become more widespread
over time, and while they may be conducted for a variety of reasons, employers mainly check in order to screen for exoffenders. 10 What effect do criminal background checks have on
the hiring of ex-offenders? This Article explores this question
using data from a representative set of employers in Los Angeles.
Though the motivations for employers' use of background checks
and their impacts on hiring ex-offenders appear heavily nuanced,
the data reveal that such checks-particularly those required by
state statutes-negatively impact the employment prospects of
11
those with records.
This expectation has prompted many who are concerned
about the successful reintegration of those with criminal records
to argue for the limited use of the criminal background check
during the employment process. 12 "Ban the box" movements, for
example, which aim to eliminate criminal history questions from
standard employment applications, have occurred in many parts
of the country, most notably in California and particularly for
13
government employment.
Promotion of such bans may in fact have limited positive impacts on the employment of ex-offenders, however, since the
magnitude of the negative effect of checking on the employment
of ex-offenders absent the legal requirement to check is not large.
More worrisome is the likelihood that these bans will have large
negative impacts on the employment of those whom we should
also be concerned about in the labor market, namely minority10 Id at 131-37.
11 Certainly, there are public safety interests that guide and motivate state statutes
requiring certain employers to check backgrounds or exclude ex-offenders. In this Article,
I remain agnostic towards this question and do not debate nor take issue with these motivations. Rather, I assume these state mandates as given but recognize that they are one
of many factors that drive employers to check backgrounds. Similarly, one could question
whether the state mandates to check are legitimate, whether states get it right with
regards to the public safety motivations of the requirements, or whether they overreach
in setting these statutes given the intended goals. These are legitimate areas of inquiry,
but for the purposes of this Article I again remain agnostic regarding these types of questions. Instead, my intent is simply to measure and assess the effects of criminal background checking given the varied reasons and ways that employers might check.
12 The cities of Los Angeles and Oakland have argued to "ban the box" to increase
employment opportunities for those with records. For more discussion of these arguments, see J. Douglas Allen-Taylor, Activists Push Dellumns to Fulfill 'Ban the Box'
Promise, Berkeley Daily Planet (Apr 1, 2008), available at <http://www.berkeleydaily
planet.com/issue/2008-04- 1/article/29636?headline=Activists-Push-Dellumns-to-FulllBan-the-Box-Promise> (last visited Mar 19, 2009).
13 For a discussion and resources regarding the "ban the box" initiative in Los Angeles, see <http://www.socialtext.net/prisoner-reentry-initiative/index.cgi?ban the box>
(last visited Mar 19, 2009).
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especially black-men without criminal records, whose employment prospects are already poor for a variety of other reasons. 14
In the absence of accurate information about the criminal background status of the applicants they consider hiring, especially
when there remains great aversion to hiring those with criminal
records, employers may infer criminality through a set of proxies
that they believe correlate strongly with such propensities. 15 Ascriptive, superficial characteristics such as race, age, or gender,
are easily identifiable, but are powerful markers in society for a
variety of things, especially perceived criminality. 16 This sort of
"statistical discrimination" engaged in by employers could prove
especially harmful to the prospects of employment for minority
men. Thus, curbing the use of the criminal background check
could have strong unintended consequences in the labor market
even while such restrictions may not generate the increase in
hiring of ex-offenders for which such proponents of bans might
17
hope.
In the remainder of this Article, I examine the empirical evidence for these claims in turn. First, I discuss in more detail the
use, potential impacts, and empirical expectations of the criminal
background check on hiring rates for ex-offenders and black men.
I then use a representative employer data set from Los Angeles
conducted in 2001 to empirically investigate the impact of criminal background checks on hiring rates for ex-offenders and black
men. The Article concludes with some policy recommendations to
improve the employability of the growing ex-offender population
14 Holzer, Collateral Costs at 268 (cited in note 8).
15 For a general discussion of employer aversion to ex-offenders, see Holzer, Raphael,
and Stoll, Will Employers Hire Former Offenders? (cited in note 6). For qualitative and
quantitative evidence of employers correlating race and criminality, see William Julius
Wilson, When Work Disappears:The World of the New Urban Poor (Vintage 1996) and
Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael, and Michael A. Stoll, Perceived Criminality, Criminal
Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J L & Econ 451
(2006), respectively.
16 See Glenn C. Loury, The Anatomy of RacialInequality 28-29 (Harvard 2002) ("Observers, doing the best they can under trying circumstances, end up partitioning the field
of human subjects in such a way that a person's hard-to-observe but functionally relevant
(say, economic) traits can be effectively estimated by conditioning on that person's evidently informative though functionally irrelevant (racial) traits.").
17 Although beyond the scope of this'Article, a separate issue concerns the distributional consequences of this kind of statistical discrimination. That is, the anticipated
increase in hiring ex-offenders that will follow from curbing the use of the criminal background check would benefit ex-offenders who are white, older, or otherwise do not fit the
proxies. This implies, as the data suggest, that employers over-estimate the statistical
likelihood of ex-offender status when they use proxies such as race, and therefore underestimate the rates of offense among those who do not fit the proxy categories.
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of mostly men while also enhancing the employment of black
men more broadly.
II. SOME PREDICTIONS ON EMPLOYMENT GIVEN CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECKS

There are several reasons to suspect potentially negative effects of criminal convictions on labor market outcomes even
without considering employers' use of the criminal background
check. On the supply side of the labor market, characteristics of
ex-offenders such as low education, poor cognitive skills, and
other personal factors, are likely to restrict employment opportunities even in the absence of a criminal record.' 8 Additionally,
those serving time fail to accumulate work experience, sever social networks that may aid in finding employment, and may experience an erosion of skills while incarcerated. 19 Hence, a prison
sentence may permanently worsen the labor market prospects of
ex-offenders, who already have dim prospects before entering
20
prison.
On the demand side, employers may be reluctant to hire
workers with criminal convictions for fear that an ex-convict may
harm a customer or be more likely to steal. Recent research confirms that employers place a premium on the trustworthiness of
employees, especially when the ability to monitor employee performance is imperfect. 21 Research using employer-based surveys
examines employer willingness to hire ex-offenders and finds
evidence, unsurprisingly, that employer aversion to ex-offenders
is quite high. 22 Research using an audit study framework also
finds that both white and black men with criminal records are
much less likely to be called back for a job interview than are

18 Holzer, CollateralCosts at 14 (cited in note 8).
19 Id.

20 See Jeffrey Grogger, The Effect of Arrests on the Employment and Earnings of
Young Men, 110 Q J Econ 51, 65 (1995) ("Prison sentences [] have a substantial impact
on earnings.").
21 Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, Will Employers Hire FormerOffenders? at 207 (cited in
note 6).
22 See, for example, Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, The Effect of an Applicant's Criminal
History on Employer Hiring Decisions and Screening Practices at 122 (cited in note 9)
(finding that only 20 percent of the surveyed employers in Los Angeles indicated that
they would definitely or probably consider an applicant with a criminal history); Holzer,
Raphael, and Stoll, Will Employers Hire Former Offenders? at 210 (cited in note 6) (finding that only 38 percent of employers surveyed in four major metropolitan areas said that
they definitely or probably would accept an application from a former offender).
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their counterparts without such records. 23 The criminal background penalty is more pronounced for blacks than whites, perhaps because employers statistically discriminate against black
men on the basis of perceived criminality, 24 as I will discuss further below.
Moreover, certain occupations are legally closed to individuals with felony convictions under state and, in some cases, federal law, 25 thus requiring employers to do criminal background
checks. Examples include jobs requiring contact with children, 26
certain health services occupations, 27 and employment with firms
providing security services. 28 These types of required checks often result in an outright ban on hiring ex-offenders. 29 However, a
criminal history is not an absolute bar to employment in all industries that require criminal background checks. 30 Even some
statutes that require checking provide for the use of discretion
for at least some classes of offenders. For example, New York
State requires background checks for all unlicensed workers in
nursing homes, but provides for discretionary hiring for broad
classes of ex-offenders. 31 The Department of Health does the
23 See Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 Am J Sociology 937, 958
(2003) (finding that white and black men with criminal records are respectively one-half
to one-third as likely as non-offenders to receive a callback).
24 See Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 49 J L & Econ at 460 (cited in note 15) ("[T]he exoffender stigma effect is larger for blacks."); Pager, 108 Am J Sociology at 959 (cited in
note 23) ('The effect of a criminal record is thus 40% larger for blacks than for whites.").
25 Jeffrey M. Hahn, Pre-Employment Information Services: Employers Beware?, 17
Empl Rel L J 45, 48 (1991) ("[Slome state statutes actually require certain background
checks into the criminal history of applicants for certain positions involving the supervision of children, such as jobs involving education or child care.").
26 See After Prison: Roadblocks to Reentry: A Report on State Legal Barriers Facing
People with Criminal Records (Legal Action
Center 2004), available at
<http://www.lac.org/roadblocks-to-reentry/upload/lacreport/LAC-PrintReport.pdf>
(last
visited Mar 18, 2009).
27 Id.
28 Id.

Id.
30 See After Prison: Roadblocks to Reentry: A Report on State Legal Barriersfacing
People with Criminal Records (Legal
Action Center
2004), available at
<http://www.lac.org/roadblocks-to-reentry/upload/lacreportLACPrintReport.pdf>
(last
visited Mar 18, 2009) (cited in note 26).
31 The Statutory New York State Public Health Law and Executive Law created a
class of convictions that acted as a presumptive bar to employment, unless the Department of Health determined that employment would not in any way jeopardize the health,
safety, or welfare of the patients. See NY Exec Law § 845-b (Consol 2008). The crimes in
this presumptive denial class include a lifetime bar for sex offenses and class A felony
convictions, as well as a ten-year ban for violent felony convictions, misdemeanors involving the endangering of the welfare of an incompetent or physically disabled person (NY
Penal Law § 260.25) and class B, C, D or E felony convictions for assault (NY Penal Law
§§ 120 et seq), larceny (NY Penal Law §§ 155.00-155.45), robbery (NY Penal Law
29
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background check and makes the final decision on the basis of a
number of factors, including the nature of the offense and the
time elapsed since the last offense. 32 Employers and many labor
market intermediaries that work with those with records often
advocate for ex-offenders in this context. For example, organizations such as the Safer Foundation in Chicago and the Center for
Employment Services in New York City often provide as much
mitigating information as possible about the ex-offender during
33
the hiring process to prospective employers.
Just as importantly, employers not statutorily required to
conduct a background check may nevertheless run criminal
background checks to make more informed decisions about hiring
ex-offenders. While studies unquestionably show that exprisoners run a high risk for recidivism, 34 risk assessments show
35
that not all ex-offenders are equally at risk for re-offending.
Background checks may, in some cases, result in increases in exoffender hiring. 36 In this study, criminal background checks refer
to employers actually running criminal background checks
through public or private entities, not by asking applicants
themselves about their criminal histories (though they could
have asked these questions separately and independently on an
employment application form). While there is no detailed information about how employers make risk assessments about hiring
§§ 160.00-160.15), diversion of prescription medications (NY Penal Law §§ 178.00178.25), controlled substances (NY Penal Law §§ 220.00-220.76), and endangering the
welfare of elderly persons (NY Penal Law §§ 260.32, 260.34).
32 Michael A. Stoll and Shawn D. Bushway, The Effect of Criminal Background
Checks on Hiring Ex-Offenders, 7 Crimincl & Pub Pol 371, 373-74 (2008).
33 See Maria L. Buck, Getting Back to Work: Employment Programsfor Ex-Offenders
12-15 (Public[Private Ventures 2000).
34 See, for example, Patrick A. Langan and David J. Levin, US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in
1994, NCJ 193427, 1 (2002) (finding that over two-thirds of prisoners released in fifteen
states in 1994 were rearrested within three years).
35 Megan C. Kurlychek, Robert Brame, and Shawn D. Bushway, Scarlet Letters and
Recidivism: Does An Old Criminal Record Predict Future Offending?, 5 Criminol & Pub
Pol 483, 498 (2006) ("[I]ndividuals last arrested in the few years leading up to age 25 are
much more likely to be arrested than individuals who were last contacted as juveniles or
arrested as 18-year-olds."); Megan C. Kurlychek, Robert Brame, and Shawn D. Bushway,
Enduring Risk? Old Criminal Records and Predictions of Future Criminal Involvement,
53 Crime & Delinquency 64, 77 (2007) ("Individuals with more recent adult records exhibit a much higher likelihood of new contacts during each follow-up period."); Paul Gendreau, Tracy Little, and Claire Goggin, A Meta-Analysis of the Predictorsof Adult Offender Recidivism: What Works!, 34 Criminol 575, 588 (1996) ("[Variables such as age, criminal history, companions, family factors, gender, social achievement, and substance abuse
are significant and potent predictors of recidivism.").
36 Stoll and Bushway, 7 Criminol & Pub Pol at 396 (cited in note 32) (finding that the
"use of background checks is negatively related to the hiring of ex-offenders").
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in practice, what we do know is that they are more open to hiring
ex-offenders with nonviolent offenses on their records, such as
drug offenses and property offenses, among, possibly, other factors.3 7 Criminal background checks can help provide this type of
mitigating information.
Finally, other employers may check ex-offender status as a
standard, routine recruitment and hiring practice for a variety of
reasons, including that they can, or perceive that they can, protect themselves against negligent hiring lawsuits. Legally, negligence is premised on the idea that one who breaches a duty of
care to others in an organization or to the public is liable for any
damages that result.3 8 Under the theory of negligent hiring, employers may be liable for the risk created by exposing the public
and their employees to potentially dangerous individuals. That
is, "employers who know, or should have known, that an employee has had a history of criminal activity may be liable for the
employee's criminal or tortious acts."39 Thus, employers may be
exposed to punitive damages as well as liability for loss, pain,
and suffering as a result of negligent hiring. If employers check
for this reason, the effect of checking on hiring ex-offenders may
be indeterminate.
These different motivations for using criminal background
checks suggest that the impact of these checks on hiring exoffenders is likely to be varied and nuanced. For employers that
check as a routine practice to protect against negligent hiring
lawsuits, for instance, checking may have little, if any, impact on
hiring ex-offenders. The expectation is that for employers that
check in this way-for example, those that use private sources to
check--checking may have no effect on hiring ex-offenders. On
the other hand, for employers that may be willing to hire exoffenders depending on the characteristics of the ex-offender
such as the crime committed, time since prison release, or accumulation of work experience, checking may increase the hiring of
37 See, for example, Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, The Effect of an Applicant's Criminal
History on Employer Hiring Decisions and Screening Practices at 128 (cited in note 9)
(finding that 40 and 46 percent of surveyed employers in Los Angeles who are willing to
hire ex-offenders would hire those with property or drug offenses, respectively, compared
to 9 percent for those with violent offenses).
38 Timothy P. Glynn, The Limited Viability of Negligent Supervision, Retention, Hiring, and Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims in Employment DiscriminationCases in
Minnesota, 24 Wm Mitchell L Rev 581, 584 (1998) ("Negligence is a theory of liability
premised on one's breach of a duty of care to another.").
39 Shawn D. Bushway, Labor Market Effects of PermittingEmployer Access to Criminal History Records, 20 J Contemp Crim Just 276, 277 (2004).
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ex-offenders. Finally, some employers are simply unwilling to
hire ex-offenders or are prompted to check by state statutes. For
these employers, the expectation is that checking is likely to
have real negative consequences on ex-offenders' employment.
The ability of ex-offenders to successfully integrate into society post-release is an important policy consideration, and certainly there is good reason to worry that background checks
could likely stymie these efforts. 40 After all, when employers review criminal history records, individuals with past convictions
are likely to be excluded from consideration. 41 Given the high
proportion of African Americans who have served time, one
might argue that such exclusion will have particularly adverse
consequences for African Americans trying to integrate into society. Of major concern in any push to limit the use of background checks is the possibility that such checks could substantially deter the hiring of certain demographic groups, such as2
4
those with high incarceration rates like African Americans.
Moreover, a small percentage of those who are denied employment because of statistical discrimination on the basis of perthat unceived criminality turn to crime since there is evidence
43
employment has a small negative impact on crime.
Though less obvious, whether employers review criminal
history records may affect the labor market prospects of individuals without criminal records. If accessibility to criminal history
information is limited (due to cost, state prohibitions or policy, or
the incompleteness of state and federal records), employers may
infer the likelihood of past criminal activity from such traits as
gender, race, or age. In the absence of a background check, employers may be likely to use such statistical discrimination to act
on their aversion to hiring ex-offenders. This practice would adversely affect the employment outcomes of individuals with clean
histories who happen to belong to demographic groups with high
40 Stoll and Bushway, 7 Criminol & Pub Pol at 396 (cited in note 32) (finding that
"use of background checks is negatively related to the hiring of ex-offenders").
41 In addition, individuals who serve time fail to accumulate work experience, sever
ties with potential employers, and may experience an erosion of skills while incarcerated,
all factors that are likely to harm one's employment prospects. For a general discussion of
these issues, see Richard B. Freeman, Crime and the Employment of Disadvantaged
Youths, in George E. Peterson and Wayne Vroman, eds, Urban Labor Markets and Job
Opportunity 201 (Urban Institute 1992); Grogger, 110 Q J Econ 51 (cited in note 20);
Jeffrey R. Kling, IncarcerationLength, Employment, and Earnings, 96 Am Econ Rev 863
(2006).
42 See Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 49 J L & Econ at 460 (cited in note 15).
43 See Steven Raphael and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime, 44 J L & Econ 259, 284 (2001).
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conviction rates overall, an effect that is likely to disproportionately impact African Americans.
These arguments suggest that the net effect of employerinitiated criminal background checks on the employment prospects of African Americans is theoretically ambiguous. Employers who review criminal history records will be more likely to
eliminate black applicants based on information revealed
through the search, while employers who do not run background
checks may eliminate black applicants based on perceived criminality. It is unclear which of these effects, if either, will predominate. Using data from the 1990s, a 2006 study by Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll demonstrated that on net, for hiring black men,
the statistical discrimination effect of limiting criminal background checks dominated the exclusion effect from checking that
is due to higher incidence of ex-offenders among the group. 44 Two
other studies produced similar results. 45 Below, I explore this
question in empirical detail using more recent data, and investigate whether this statistical discrimination is more pronounced
both for black men with less educational attainment and for employers who perceive that they are legally required to check (and
therefore more sensitive to claims about negligent hiring lawsuits), as should be expected.
III. DATA AND DESCRIPTION OF MAIN VARIABLES
The data used to examine these questions were collected using twenty-minute telephone surveys administered to 619 establishments in Los Angeles. 46 The survey was administered be44 Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 49 J L & Econ at 469 (cited in note 15) (finding "a positive overall effect of checking criminal backgrounds on the hiring of black males").
45 See Keith Finlay, Effect of Employer Access to Criminal History Data on the Labor
Market Outcomes of Ex-Offenders and Non-Offenders, Working Paper 13935, 24 (Natl
Bureau of Econ Rsrch 2008); Pager, 108 Am J Sociology at 958 (cited in note 23).
46 The survey was conducted in Los Angeles because it is a large and populous metropolitan area in a state with a large incarcerated population. It may be problematic that
the data comes from a single metropolitan area, and thus may not necessarily be similar
to other cases or areas. But a comparable employer survey in the mid-1990s revealed that
employers were all similarly averse to hiring ex-offenders in Los Angeles, Atlanta, Boston, and Detroit and that such aversion varied across key variables, such as industry, in
strikingly similar patterns across these metropolitan areas. Likewise, there was a strong
similarity in the extent to which employers checked the criminal backgrounds of their
applicants across these metropolitan areas. See Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, Will Employers Hire Former Offenders? at 215 (cited in note 6). This was true despite the fact that
California is identified in the 2002 Compendium of State Privacy and Security Legislation
as having some of the most restrictive statutes regarding access to the criminal records
maintained for the criminal justice system. See US Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Compendium of State Security and Privacy Legislation:2002 Overview,
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tween May 2001 and November 2001. Employers were drawn
from lists complied by Survey Sampling Inc. ("SSI"), primarily
from telephone directories. To the extent possible, the phone interviews were conducted with the person in the establishment
who is responsible for entry-level hiring. Establishments were
screened according to whether they had hired an employee into a
position not requiring a college degree within the previous year.
However, this screen did not eliminate any firms from our sample. 47 The overall survey response rate was 65 percent, in the
48
range of other similar firm surveys.

To gauge ex-offender hiring at the firm, I probe survey questions that ask whether a person's business in the past year has
hired any men with criminal records: "yes," "no," "do not know,"
or "if yes, how many hired?"
Based on answers to these questions, actual hiring of exoffenders is defined as the percent of all jobs (filled and unfilled)
in the firm that had been filled by ex-offenders over the last
year. 49 Figure 3 (and Table A.1 in the Appendix) shows that
about 1.4 percent of jobs are filled by ex-offenders in the sample.
Criminal History Record Information, NCJ 200030, 10 (2003), available at
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cspsl02.pdf> (last visited Mar 18, 2009). It is also
not one of the twenty-nine states with open-records policies allowing non-criminal justice
access to the public repository without statutory authorization. Id. Thus, these similarities bring some confidence that the results of this analysis will not be specific to Los Angeles or California.
47 The surveyed firms were drawn from a sample that was stratified ex ante by establishment size. Sampling across strata was performed in proportion to the amount of regional employment accounted for by the establishment size category. Within strata, firms
were sampled at random. Thus, the sample is representative of the distribution of the
workforce in the Los Angeles region across establishment size categories without any
need for additional size-weighting. While there are concerns with the data in studying
these issues, as we discuss below, it represents the best available data to investigate
these questions. We carefully probe the data and conduct empirical checks to estimate the
magnitude of the concerns, the expected direction of bias if any, and the factors that
might mitigate the concerns.
48 See Harry J. Holzer and Michael A. Stoll, Employers and Welfare Recipients: The
Effects of Welfare Reform in the Workplace 11 (Pub Pol Inst of Cal 2001) (citing a response
rate of around 70 percent for a 1998-99 survey administered to roughly 750 employers);
Jeffrey R. Kling, High Performance Work Practices and Firm Performance, 118 Monthly
Labor Rev 29, 36 n 3 (May 1995); Harry J. Holzer, What Employers Want: Job Prospects
for Less-Educated Workers 16 (Russell Sage 1996) (citing a response rate of roughly 67
percent).
49 I also developed a second actual hiring measure defined as the percentage of exoffenders in new hires at the firm over the last year. Larger firms, which are more likely
to check, may also be more likely to hire ex-offenders, and also do a lot of overall hiring
generally. Thus, firm size may account for much of the discrepancy in hiring of exoffenders between firms that check and do not. As a result, this second, alternative measure of ex-offender hiring was explored since it should be less sensitive to these concerns.
Though conceptually different, the qualitative results were the same as those for the
variable shown here that is measured against all jobs in the firm.
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This compares favorably to estimates of the fraction of exoffenders in the overall labor force, so the measure of actual hir50
ing seems reasonable.
Still, some may worry that employers do not know the criminal background of all of their workers. It is unlikely that all employers know whether they have hired ex-offenders, or the true
number they have hired. Our focus, however, is on those who
check. About half of the employers in this survey actually perform criminal background checks for every employee hired, and
another 20 percent check some of the time. Moreover, previous
work using similar employer surveys shows that a number of
employers (about 20 percent) have contact with employment
agencies that attempt to place disadvantaged workers, including
ex-offenders, into jobs. 5 1 Nonetheless, the lack of complete information means that the level of ex-offender hiring at the firm is
likely to be systematically underestimated, especially for firms
that do not check, but this pattern means that the estimated impact of checking on hiring ex-offenders works toward finding no
effect; that is, a conservative estimate of the impact of checking.
What percentage of employers do criminal background
checks? The survey asks how often the employer checks the applicant's criminal record: "always," "sometimes," or "never." Figure 1 presents the distribution of employer responses to the
question on criminal background checks. In addition, we present
the distribution of these responses to the exact question asked in
an earlier employer survey, with data collected in Los Angeles
from 1992 to 1994.52 The results show that criminal background
checks have risen substantially over the 1990s, perhaps because
of the decreasing cost and easier access to such checks through
the internet. Employer data for 1992 to 1994 show that approximately 32 percent of employers in the sample say that they always check, 16 percent indicate that they check sometimes, while
52 percent say that they never check. 53 The 1992 to 94 survey
50 Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, Will Employers Hire Former Offenders? at 234 (cited in
note 6) (estimating that in 1999, the total stock of unemployed former felons at any point
in time was about 3 to 4 percent of the labor force, while that of former prisoners was
about 1.5 to 2 percent of the labor force).
51 Holzer and Stoll, Employers and Welfare Recipients at 19 (cited in note 48).
52 This survey, called the Multi-City Employer Survey, was developed by Harry J.
Holzer and successfully completed telephone interviews with 3,220 employers between
1992 and 1994 in four cities (approximately 800 per city): Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and
Los Angeles. For a complete description and discussion of this survey, see Holzer, What
Employers Want (cited in note 48).
53 Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, The Effect of An Applicant's Criminal History on Em-
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collected data on this question before the emergence of internet
services that provide low-cost criminal background checks. 54 By
2001, approximately 46 percent of employers in the sample say
that they always check, 18 percent indicate that they check
55
sometimes, while 37 percent say that they never check.
Analysis of earlier work on this question reports that the increase in checking has been widespread, occurring within almost
all firms regardless of their industry, size, or location. 56 That
work also confirms that much of this increase in checking is due
to the availability and low-cost of using private checking agencies.5 7 Still, in any given period of time, larger firms (mostly because they are likely to have formal human resources departments) and industries with more customer contact-such as retail; trade; services; and Fire, Insurance, and Real Estate
58
("FIRE")-are much more likely to check criminal backgrounds.
The survey also gauges whether employers were legally required to check and how they checked-whether through criminal justice agencies, private sources, or other methods. Figure 2
indicates that about 20 percent of all employers check because of
legal requirements. Of the employers who always check, about
half do so because of legal requirements. One potential hurdle in
reporting this data is the difficulty of disentangling whether employers are actually legally required to check or only perceive
that they are. In California, employers who are statutorily required to check backgrounds for certain jobs must use the Bureau of Criminal Identification to do so, and they are not allowed
to use private vendors.5 9 Private vendors make use of publicly
available information from court records and other sources, and
the information is not guaranteed to match the information in

ployer HiringDecisions and Screening Practicesat 130 (cited in note 9).
54 Companies such as Pinkerton Security Services provide criminal background
checking services for as little as $15 per check. For services provided by Pinkerton, see
<http://www.ci-pinkerton.com/background.html> (last visited Mar 18, 2009).
55 Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, The Effect of an Applicant's Criminal History on Employer Hiring Decisions and Screening Practicesat 130 (cited in note 9).
56 For the remainder of the Article, whether a firm checks criminal backgrounds is
equated with those firms that always check since there is little difference in behavior and
hiring for those firms that indicate that they sometimes or never check.
57 Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, The Effect of an Applicant's Criminal History on Employer HiringDecisions and Screening Practicesat 135 (cited in note 9).
58 See Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, Will Employers Hire Former Offenders? at 220
(cited in note 6).
59 See US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Compendium of State
Security and Privacy Legislation (cited in note 46).
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the public repository (for example, criminal justice agency). 60
Thus, the right inference is that employers who check using the
public repositories rather than private sources are much more
61
likely to be legally required to check.
Though not shown here, the data indicate that 56 percent of
employers who indicate that they were legally required to check
used criminal justice agencies (which is consistent with the use
of public repositories), while 31 percent used private sources. The
remaining 13 to 14 percent use other methods that are not reported in the data. This compares with 19 and 67 percent, respectively, for checking employers who indicate that they were
not legally required to check. 62 Thus, the data suggest that a sizable fraction of employers are likely inaccurate in their assessment of legal requirements to check.
IV. THE IMPACT OF CHECKING ON HIRING EX-OFFENDERS

Earlier work on employer attitudes towards, an4 actual hiring of, ex-offenders has convincingly shown employer' aversion to
this group. 63 A central question related to this issuq is what is
the impact of checking criminal backgrounds on the hiring of exoffenders? To accurately assess this impact, we need to control
extensively for establishment characteristics and employer beha60 See Shawn Bushway, et al, Private Providers of Criminal History Records: Do You
Get What You Pay For?, in Shawn Bushway, Michael A. Stoll, and David F. Weiman, eds,
Barriersto Reentry? The Labor Market for Released Prisoners in Post-IndustrialAmerica
174, 180 (Russell Sage 2007) ('The major concern [with the private criminal history
records industry] is the transmission of inaccurate data.").
61 I examined the Compendium of State Security and Privacy Legislation from the
US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics and identified the likely four digit
standard industrial classification ("SIC") codes for employers legally required to check
according to California statutes. I then weighted industries by employee size using data
from the 2000 US Census for California and calculated the industrial distribution of
industries that are legally required to check criminal background. Finally, I compared
this distribution to the industrial distribution of employers in the sample that indicated
that they were legally required to check and used criminal justice methods to do so. I
found very similar distributions across these two estimates, with about 90 percent of
industries (and employers) located in the service industry.
62 There is a potential measurement problem here. Firms that are required to check
may not deal directly with a criminal justice agency. In California, employers deal directly with the regulating agency covered by the statute, and that agency deals with the
Bureau of Criminal Identification. Employers may also contract out this function to a
private human resources company, which would nonetheless get the information from the
Bureau of Criminal Identification as required by law.
63 See Pager, 108 Am J Sociology at 959 (cited in note 23); Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll,
Will Employers Hire Former Offenders? at 210 (cited in note 6); Holzer, Raphael, and
Stoll, The Effect of an Applicant's Criminal History on Employer Hiring Decisions and
Screening Practicesat 122 (cited in note 9).
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viors that also drive the employment of this group. I do this using regression analysis with the following equation to estimate
the actual hiring of ex-offenders:
%Jobs Filled E - Offendersk =CBCftj +,6', 2 Xk +

(1)

where CBC is whether the firm checks the criminal background
of applicants in firm k (and further disaggregated in subsequent
models into whether the firm is legally required to check and the
method of checking used, discussed above) and X is a variety of
independent establishment-level variables 64 for firm k. Since a
large fraction of establishments have hired no ex-offenders
(about 80 percent), equation (1) is estimated with the Tobit func65
tional form so as to censor the zero values.
Variation in ex-offender hiring at the firm may be attributable to several factors, including the establishment's characteristics such as size, industry, location, vacancy rates, skill needs,
presence of collective bargaining, minority ownership, and nonprofit status. Larger firms, firms in industries with little customer contact such as manufacturing, construction and transportation, as well as firms that are more proximate to ex-offender
populations, such as those in the central city, will be more likely
to hire ex-offenders. This is also likely true for firms that have a
larger fraction of lower skilled jobs 66 (that might match the skill
levels of ex-offenders) and greater labor needs (as measured by
their vacancy rates).
Employer attitudes towards ex-offenders are also likely to be
6
correlated with their actual hiring of them as shown elsewhere.
To gauge these attitudes, I explore measures of employers' willingness to hire ex-offenders, categorized by those employers who
are willing (very willing or somewhat willing), unwilling (very
unwilling or somewhat unwilling), or who indicate that their willingness depends on the crime that the applicant committed (hereafter coined "offense dependent employers"). These attitudes,
however, are strongly correlated with whether employers check
64 The statistical properties of these control variables are shown in the Appendix,
Table A. 1.
65 Tobit analysis best fits the data, though I experimented with other models such as
ordinary least squares regression.
66 Lower skilled jobs refer to those jobs that do not require any particular skills,
education, previous training, or experience when filled.
67 Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, The Effect of an Applicant's Criminal History on Employer Hiring Decisions and Screening Practices at 124 (cited in note 9) (finding that an
employer's stated willingness to hire ex-offenders is indicative of actual hiring practices).

396

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2009:

the criminal backgrounds of these workers, and this potential
multicollinearity presents some problems in introducing these
68
into the model specification.
Finally, another concern in the actual measures of exoffender hiring is that, while it provides information on employers' actual behavior with respect to hiring male workers with
criminal backgrounds, it is also likely to reflect a mix of demandside (that is, firm) and supply-side (that is, worker) factors that
might influence employment of such workers by these firms. For
instance, to the extent that ex-offenders perceive that their job
prospects are weaker at firms that check backgrounds than those
that do not check, they will be less likely to apply, and therefore
less likely to be hired at establishments that check. This selfselection of ex-offender applicants across firms that check and do
not check could lead to a spurious relationship between checking
and ex-offender hiring, and without adequate controls could upwardly bias the expected negative effect of checking on hiring exoffenders.
Unfortunately, the data does not provide information on the
criminal background status of applicants. Instead, I use as proxies the racial composition of firms' applicants. African Americans
and Latinos are overrepresented among those with ex-offender
backgrounds. Although not a perfect proxy for ex-offender applicants to firms, they are significant predictors of hiring of ex69
offenders, though I do acknowledge their limitation.
68 When these attitudinal variables are added to the model specification the results
indicate, as expected, that employer willingness to hire ex-offenders is significantly and
positively related to actual ex-offender hiring. However, the magnitude of the negative
effect of criminal background checks on hiring ex-offenders is reduced by about a third
and it loses its statistical significance. Despite this, the coefficient remains reasonably
large in magnitude. As noted, there is a strong correlation between employer willingness
to hire ex-offenders and whether the firm checks. Therefore, including these employer
attitude variables may over-control for relevant factors in the model. Though not displayed here, the data show that employers that are willing to hire ex-offenders are much
less likely to check criminal backgrounds, even when controls for firm characteristics are
taken into account. Thus, the potential multicollinearity between employer willingness to
hire ex-offenders and whether firms check backgrounds is likely to bias towards zero the
effect of background checks on hiring ex-offenders when employer attitudes towards these
groups are included in the model. Still, when employer attitude measures are included in
models in which the firms' background check variable is disaggregated into legally required to check and not legally required, the statistical significance and magnitude of the
coefficient on legally required to check is largely unaffected, as one should expect, given
that the legal mandates are somewhat independent of employer attitudes towards exoffenders. Because of this concern, in the analysis shown here, I do not include these
employer attitude variables into the model.
69 1 also experimented with a number of other potential proxies for ex-offender applicant measures. These include a variety of variables generated from U.S. Census 2000
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Rather than reporting the entire regression results for all
models, I report the major findings in Figure 3, which summarizes the results of regression models based on equation (1) estimating the influence of criminal background checks on hiring exoffenders. Figure 3 provides the predicted hiring rates of exoffenders for employers by method and reason for checking.
These predictions are based on information gathered from the
regression results using the model described above, controlling
70
for relevant firm characteristics previously mentioned.
Each panel reports results from separate regression models.
The first column simply reports that on average, firms filled 1.4
percent of their openings with ex-offenders over the past year.
Panel A summarizes the overall influence of criminal background
checks on this hiring. It indicates that, controlling for relevant
factors, among firms that do not check about 2.2 percent of the
jobs filled in the past year were filled by ex-offenders. For firms
that do check backgrounds, the results show that on average only
about 1.1 percent of the jobs filled in the past year were filled by
ex-offenders. This sizeable and statistically significant difference
in employment rates of ex-offenders suggests that criminal background checks limit the hiring of ex-offenders. These results lend
support to policy efforts to restrict background checks in order to
increase the hiring of ex-offenders.
Panel B further probes the influence of criminal backgrounds checks by disaggregating checking into firms legally required to check and firms not legally required to check. Panel B
shows that firms legally required to conduct background checks
hired ex-offenders into 1.1 percent of job openings over the past
year, a statistically significant difference from the 2.2 percent exoffender employment rate by employers who did not check. This
panel also shows that firms that check, but are not legally required to do so, hire ex-offenders at a rate of 2.3 percent. This is
around the same 2.1 percent rate as those firms that do not
check. This evidence does not support the claim that checking
itself negatively impacts the hiring of ex-offenders. Rather, it
data sources such as the firms weighted distance to populations and characteristics of
males that are highly correlated with ex-offenders such as those that did not complete
high school (and by race), or those who are "idle," that is, not working, not going to school,
and did not complete high school (and by race). These variables were geocoded to the
survey of employers at the census tract level. However, none of these measures were ever
statistically associated with the ex-offender hiring variables.
70 The entire regression results and output are available from the author upon request.
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strongly suggests that the legal requirement to check is the
source of the impact.
Panel C further disaggregates those who are legally required
to check into those who check using the California public repository and those who report using other sources of information. 7 1
In California, as noted earlier, employers who are statutorily required to check backgrounds for certain jobs must use the public
repository to do so. Thus, those employers who indicate that they
are legally required to check and check using criminal justice
methods are more likely to be actually required to check. Those
reporting a requirement to check and using other sources are
likely to be misreporting a legal requirement to check.
Panel C summarizes these regressions into predicted hiring
rates. It indicates that firms that are legally required to check
and use the public repository hire ex-offenders at a rate of only
0.3 percent, a statistically significant drop from the 2.2 percent
rate for employers who do not check. On the other hand, those
employers who perceive that they are legally required to check,
but do so using private sources, hired ex-offenders into 1.6 percent of jobs over the past year. This is not statistically significantly different from those who do not check. Interestingly, the
predicted hiring rate of ex-offenders for those employers who
check-through either public or private methods-but do not believe they are legally required to do so is not statistically different from those employers who do not check as well. Combined,
these findings indicate that the average effect of background
checking on hiring ex-offenders is driven nearly entirely by state
statutes that require checking.
The results for those employers who check but who do not
believe they are legally required to do so is consistent with the
idea that some employers check to protect themselves against
possible negligent hiring lawsuits. Because of the availability of
relatively quick and inexpensive methods of checking that can be
accessed through private companies on the internet, it is possible
71 In these models, a key problem in identifying the relationship between employer
checking and hiring of ex-offenders is that employer attitudes could drive such checking
of criminal backgrounds. This leads to a spurious correlation between checking and hiring
of ex-offenders. Controlling for extensive firm and employer characteristics partly addresses this concern, but not fully. Given the data available to me, the best test of this
identification is whether the impact of checking on hiring ex-offenders is stronger for
those employers who indicate that they were legally required to check. Employer attitudes should not affect whether firms are legally required to check (especially for those
who use criminal justice agencies to check). The results suggest that checking through
legal mandate has real, negative results on hiring ex-offenders.
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that some employers are using these methods to protect themselves against potential negligent hiring lawsuits. This does not
imply that these employers do not care about or examine the results of the background checks. They probably do, and use the
information in reasonable ways. Based on the information from
the check, some employers may set a threshold above which they
may be prompted to act in various ways including denial of employment or extra monitoring of the employee. This threshold
could include whether the ex-offender was convicted of a violent
offense, or recently released from prison, for example. Below this
threshold, these actions are unlikely to take place. Still, regardless of the information from the criminal background check, the
employer is in a better position to demonstrate that they weighed
the record of the applicant against the risks of the job when they
check backgrounds than when they do not check.
Thus, the employers that check for this reason may or may
not be averse to hiring ex-offenders, but if they do hire them,
they are likely to show due diligence by producing evidence of
doing criminal background checks. This act may bolster a defense against such lawsuits. If some employers are checking to
protect themselves from these lawsuits, then the effect of background checks on hiring ex-offenders should be less negative for
those employers who check when they are not legally required to
do so and who use private methods to do so. 7 2 The results here
are consistent with this idea.
These results, and others produced elsewhere, 73 are also consistent with the idea that some employers check to gain additional information about the ex-offenders whom they may consider hiring. Offense dependent employers should be more likely
to conduct background checks and use the information from
background checks to help make intelligent, risk-assessed hiring
decisions compared to employers who indicate they are willing to
hire ex offenders-and perhaps even employers that indicate
72 In fact, evidence from the data is consistent with the idea that employers who use
private sources of checking are much less averse to hiring ex-offenders than employers
who use criminal justice agencies. About 44 percent of employers who use criminal justicesagencies indicate that they are unwilling to hire ex-offenders, while about 36 percent
of employers indicate this for those who use private methods of checking. Alternatively
put, about 18 percent of employers who use private methods of checking are willing to
hire ex-offenders, while the equivalent figure is 9 percent for employers who use criminal
justice methods.
73 Stoll and Bushway, 7 Criminol & Pub Pol at 395 (cited in note 32) ("[T]he evidence
... is consistent with the idea that some firms perform checks to gain information and
not necessarily to exclude altogether the hiring of ex-offenders.").
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they are unwilling to hire ex-offenders. The assumption is that
offense dependent employers will use more information about the
ex-offenders to help them assess their willingness to hire. The
information that may make a difference in whether these employers are ultimately willing to hire or do hire may include,
among other factors, the type of crime for which the offender was
convicted (that is, violent or non-violent, etc.), how long they
have been out of prison, and whether they have gained any work
74
experience since prison.
Using the same data set and a similar methodology, results
75
from Stoll and Bushway are consistent with these expectations.
They show that offense dependent employers are more likely to
check than even unwilling employers. 76 Moreover, at least compared with willing employers, they also show that offense dependent employers are much more likely to use criminal justice
agencies to check, which are more accurate sources of checking
than private agencies.7 7 Finally, for employers who check to
glean additional information, the expectation should also be that
the negative effect on ex-offender employment of checking for
these offense dependent employers should be weaker than the
negative effect of checks for the willing or unwilling employers.
They find evidence for these expectations and also show that the
effect of checking with private sources is generally insignificant
for all employers but is positive (though not significant) for of78
fense dependent employers.
V. STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST BLACK MEN

These findings on the use and effect of criminal background
checks are more varied and nuanced than expected. With the
widespread view that all such checks generate less hiring of exoffenders, some have suggested suppressing the information to
which employers have access regarding criminal records in order
to increase ex-offenders' employability. 79 Given the discussion of
"statistical discrimination," it is possible that the suppression of
74 See Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, The Effect of an Applicant's Criminal History on
Employer HiringDecisionsand Screening Practicesat 128 (cited in note 9).
75 See Stoll and Bushway, 7 Criminol & Pub Pol at 392 (cited in note 32).
76 See id.

77 See id; Bushway, et al, Private Providers of Criminal History Records at 191 (cited
in note 62) (finding an 8 percent consistency rate on reported arrests between FBI records
and a private company's search).
7s See Stoll and Bushway, 7 Criminol & Pub Pol at 392-93 (cited in note 32).
79 See note 12 for some cities that have explored this option.

381]

BACKGROUND CHECKS AND RACIAL CONSEQUENCES

401

this information to these employers will decrease their general
willingness to hire those who employers suspect are likely to be
ex-offenders, such as black men.
Incarceration and crime rates among black men are disproportionately high, with about a million black men currently incarcerated, and millions more either ex-inmates or felons who
are currently or have been on probation.80 One possibly unanticipated consequence of these high rates of crime and incarceration
may be an overall reduction in employment prospects for black
men, even those with no criminal background themselves. This
could occur when employers cannot accurately distinguish between those who do and do not have criminal backgrounds, and
avoid hiring altogether those whom they suspect of having criminal records. As noted above, about 37 to 55 percent of employers
in Los Angeles do not regularly do criminal background checks,
despite the increase in their use over the past decade.8 1
Because many employers have little or no information on
exactly which applicants engage in crime, they may become more
reluctant to hire any black men because of perceived criminality
amongst this group. This would be a form of statistical discrimination, in which employers make employment decisions based on
the perceived or real characteristics of the groups to which individuals belong, when it is too costly to gain more information
about the individuals themselves. Interestingly, the more information available to employers about the criminal histories of individuals, the less likely the potential discrimination against
black men in general, even if there will be greater reluctance to
hire individuals with criminal records under these circumstances.
The effect of employer-initiated criminal background checks
on the employment outcomes of African Americans depends in
part on the manner in which employers make use of such information. Theoretically, the impact of an employer-initiated criminal background check on the likelihood that the employer hires
African American applicants is ambiguous. On the one hand,
given that blacks are more likely to have a prior conviction,8 2
80 Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael, and Michael A. Stoll, How Do Employer Perceptions of Crime and IncarcerationAffect the Employment Prospects of Less-Educated Young
Black Men?, in Ronald B. Mincy, ed, Black Males Left Behind 67, 69 (Urban Institute
2006).
81 See data in Figure 1.
82 For example, in 2003, there were 3,405 convicted black men per 100,000 U.S. resident black men, while the equivalent figure for white men was 465 per 100,000 U.S. resi-
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employers that remove applicants from consideration based on
the results of background checks should be more likely to exclude
African Americans from consideration. Holding all else constant,
this would surely reduce the probability of hiring a black applicant.
On the other hand, as just mentioned, in the absence of a
criminal background check, an employer may infer the likelihood
of past criminal activity via visible markers such as race or age.
If the tendency of employers is to overestimate the likelihood
that black applicants have prior felony convictions, the information infusion associated with a systematic background check may
actually increase the likelihood that an African American applicant is hired. Of course, this information effect from a background check (which essentially eliminates the impact of statistical discrimination) would counter the exclusionary effect associated with the higher incidence of previous convictions among
African American applicants. A priori,one cannot predict the net
impact on the likelihood of hiring a black worker.
To explore this question in more detail, I use the same data
described above, the same establishment control variables, but
focus on the percentage of the last hired workers at the firm who
are black as the main dependent variable. This variable is defined and measured exactly as that used by Holzer, Raphael, and
Stoll,8 3 but I use the more recent data set described here. Using
this employer survey, I will estimate the following equation:
%LastHire-BlackMalek=CBCk3 21

-J'

22

Xk + e2k

(2)

where CBC is whether the firm checks the criminal background
of applicants in firm k (and further disaggregated in subsequent
models into whether the firm is legally required to check and the
method of checking used, discussed above) and X is the same independent establishment level variables for firm k discussed
above. I also estimate equations for the percentage of last hired
workers who are whites, Latinos, or black females for comparison.
For ease of interpretation, the presentation of findings will
also summarize the results of regression models based on equation (2) that estimate the influence of criminal background
checks on hiring of black men, rather than reporting the entire
dent white men. Paige M. Harrison and Allen J. Beck, US Department of Justice, Bureau
of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Prisonersin 2003, NCJ 205335, 9, Table 12 (2004).
83 See Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 49 J L & Econ at 464 (cited in note 15).
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regression results for all models. Like the results presented
above, these average predictions are based on information ga4
thered from the regression results using equation (2).8
Based on equation (2), Figure 4 presents results that summarize the overall influence of criminal background checks on
hiring by the race and sex of the last hired worker. Each model
shown on the figure represents separate regression estimates,
and indicates the predicted hiring means for each race and sex
group given whether the employer checks criminal backgrounds
or not.85 The results indicate that criminal background checks
only have statistical significance for the hiring of black males.
For employers that check backgrounds, about 12 percent of their
last hired workers were black males, while the comparable figure
for those employers who do not check is 3 percent, a difference of
about 9 percentage points. This pattern is not as stark for black
women, a smaller fraction of whom are ex-offenders (compared
with black men) and who are arguably less likely to be perceived
by employers as ex-offenders. Neither does this pattern exist for
whites or Latinos. The point estimate of the difference in hiring
black males by whether firms check backgrounds at 8.7 percentage points is similar in magnitude to the estimates found by
Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, who use data from the early 1990s
86
and across four metropolitan areas.
This pattern occurs for black men despite the fact that they
are overrepresented among those with ex-offender backgrounds.87 Given this fact, we should have expected the hiring of
black men to decline with employer's use of criminal background
checks. Apparently, the additional information spurred by background checks lessens employer perceptions of the criminality of
black men. Thus, the evidence thus far points to the net effect of
criminal background check use on hiring black men being dominated by statistical discrimination.
I also estimate additional models in which I examine the
impact of criminal background checks on hiring black males by
employer willingness to hire ex-offenders, and by the educational
attainment of the last hired black male. If statistical discrimination is driving the effect of criminal background checks on hiring
84 Again, the entire regression results and output for these equations are available
from the author upon request.
85 Whites and Latinos are grouped to conserve space since results for these groups by
sex were not significant.
86 See Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 49 J L & Econ at 470 (cited in note 15).
87 See Harrison and Beck, NCJ 205335 at 9 & Table 12 (cited in note 82).
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black males, we should expect that these results should be much
stronger for those employers who are more averse to hiring exoffenders.88 Employers who are more averse to hiring exoffenders and who do not do criminal background checks will be
more likely to rely on social markers to infer criminality. In addition, I argue that this result should also be much stronger for
black males with less educational attainment. To the extent that
employers use social markers of criminality, this statistical discrimination should be more targeted at black males with less
educational attainment.
Figures 5 and 6 present the results of these investigations.
Figure 5 presents results of a regression equation that predicts
the average hiring rates of black males by whether employers
check criminal backgrounds interacted with their stated willingness to hire ex-offenders, controlling for relevant firm characteristics.8 9 The results show that the impact of criminal background checks on hiring black men is more pronounced for those
employers who are unwilling to hire ex-offenders, which is consistent with statistical discrimination. These results are consistent with, but slightly larger in magnitude than, those found by
Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll.90 In that study, which used data from
four metropolitan areas in the early 1990s, the difference in hiring rates of black men between firms that check and do not check
and between those firms that are wiling to hire as opposed to not
willing to hire ex-offenders is about 5 percentage points. The
comparable estimate in this study using more recent data for
only Los Angeles is about 10 percentage points.
Unlike the data used by Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 91 the
current survey includes a response category for offense dependent employers. Interestingly, for these employers, the impact of
criminal background checks on hiring black men is just as strong
as for those employers who are unwilling to hire ex-offenders.
This suggests that, even for employers who may consider hiring
ex-offenders, the absence of accurate information about appli88 See Holzer, Raphael,

and Stoll, 49 J L & Econ at 473 (cited in note 15)

("[E]mployers with a particularly strong aversion to ex-offenders may be more likely to
overestimate the relationship between criminality and race and hence hire too few African Americans as a result.").
89 This means that interaction terms are included in the model specification between
criminal background checks and the categories for employer attitudes towards exoffenders. The main effects for these categories are also included.
90 See Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 49 J L & Econ at 465 (cited in note 15).
91 Id (using a survey that asked whether employer was definitely willing, probably
willing, probably not willing, or definitely not willing to hire ex-offenders).
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cants' criminal backgrounds may prompt them to use statistical
discrimination as a method of hiring as well.
Figure 6 presents results of two regression equations that
predict the average hiring rates of black males by their educational attainment level. Model 1 predicts average hiring rates for
black men with a high school degree or less, while Model 2 predicts these for black men with some college or more. The results
indicate that the impact of criminal background checks is
slightly stronger on hiring black men with more limited education, though the impact on both groups is statistically significant.
The difference between these two impacts is marginally statistically significant (at the 10 percent level, though not shown).
These results are consistent with, and provide more evidence in
support of, the idea that the impact of criminal background
checks on hiring rates for black men is being driven by this type
of statistical discrimination.
Finally, I explore the hiring rates of black men by firms that
check, sorted by whether the firm is legally required to check and
the method by which they do so. This approach provides more
information about the conditions under which the propensity to
hire black males are greatest-specifically at firms that check. A
priori, one would expect those firms that are checking for more
information or are checking to protect against potential negligent
hiring claims to hire greater numbers of black men. These would
include those firms that check and are not legally required to do
so, and those firms that believe they are legally required to do so
but use private methods (that is, are probably not actually legally required to check). This is because such firms are likely more
agnostic towards hiring ex-offenders generally, and that checking
criminal backgrounds lessens the reliance of using race as a
proxy of criminality.
Figure 7 presents data from this equation that predict average hiring rates of black males by interactions between whether
firms are legally required to check and the method with which
they do so. The data provide results that are somewhat, but not
fully supportive of these expectations. The data show that some
firms-likely checking to protect against negligent hiring claims
(that is, those employers that check but are not legally required
to do so)-hire black males the least relative to other types of
firms, especially compared to those that are actually legally required to do so. On the other hand, one could argue that the employers most likely to check because of fear of such negligent hiring claims are those that believe they are legally required to
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check but do so using private sources. Their motivation for checking could also be fear of violating state statues as well. Still, the
hiring rates of black males are greatest for these firms relative to
other types of checking firms, which provides some evidence for
these expectations.
VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The results of the analysis suggest a potential dilemma for
public policy. If the policy aims are to enhance the employability
of ex-offenders, to lessen recidivism, and increase successful integration, then many would argue that limiting the use of criminal background checks during the employment process should be
considered. The assumption here is that such checks act as a
complete ban on ex-offenders and therefore unambiguously harm
them during the employment process. On the other hand, the
results from these data indicate that, in the absence of criminal
background checks and information about the existence of any
criminal record of a prospective employee, employers may rely on
physical characteristic proxies for criminality, such as race, especially for those employers that are averse to hiring ex-offenders
and may statistically discriminate against those belonging to
groups with a disproportionate number of ex-offenders. Such limits on the use of criminal backgrounds checks, therefore, could
unambiguously harm those who are members of social groups
that are disproportionately represented by ex-offenders, such as
African Americans, even if an individual member of that group is
not an ex-offender themselves. Use of proxies that are protected
categories under Title VII, such as race, sex, or national origin
would be a violation of employment discrimination law. 92 Based
upon this, some may argue for more criminal background checks
to provide more accurate criminal background information about
the applicants that employers are considering in order to lessen
the amount of statistical discrimination in the labor market.
The results shown here provide some, but not full, support to
the ideas that drive these competing policy objectives. The results indicate that the use and effect of such checks on hiring ex92 For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII 42 USC §§ 2000e, 2000e-2
(2006) ([Section 703] indicates that for employer practices "[iut shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin....").
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offenders are more nuanced than previously believed. In the aggregate, criminal background checks do negatively affect the hiring of ex-offenders, and the magnitude of this effect is important
but not complete. Counter to expectations, almost all of this negative effect is driven by legal requirements to check that are
mandated by state statutes. For firms that check for other reasons, the evidence shows that hiring rates of ex-offenders are
largely unaffected by such checks. The evidence suggests two
factors that may account for this puzzle. First, some employers
may check to protect themselves against possible negligent hiring lawsuits and therefore may be more agnostic toward whether
they actually hire ex-offenders. Second, some employers check to
gain additional information about the ex-offenders whom they
may consider hiring to help make risk assessed hiring decisions.
Those employers who seek additional information about exoffenders are more likely to check criminal backgrounds than
employers who are willing or unwilling to hire such individuals.
They also hire more ex-offenders when they check criminal backgrounds when not legally required to do so.
The results also indicate that when employers do criminal
background checks during hiring, the hiring rates of black men
increase. This counterintuitive finding suggests that the impact
of statistical discrimination against black men by those employers who do not conduct criminal background checks dominates
the impact of excluding black men during hiring by employers
who do criminal background checks as a result of the greater likelihood that black men have convictions. Thus, promoting criminal background checks may curb statistical discrimination and
increase the hiring of black men more generally.
But is promoting checking in all cases the best policy response given these tensions? Although ex-offenders are not a protected class under Title VII, 93 employment discrimination
against this group should be cause for concern. Exclusion from
legitimate employment increases the risk of recidivism and is
therefore costly to society, especially if exclusion of this group is
not fully justified by business necessity. Thus, promoting criminal background checks in all circumstances may not be appropriate either. Recognizing this, some states have made clear that
the criteria that guide their use should be narrowly tailored to
the appropriateness of the criminal background check given the
93 Id (prohibiting employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin).
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job requirements and characteristics into which employers are
hiring and the public interest. 94 Nonetheless, it is also arguable
that some states, given their response to crime over the past two
decades, may have overreached in what is considered business
necessity or in the public interest, enacting state statutes on
checking criminal backgrounds for certain jobs or on excluding
ex-offenders from specific jobs altogether that are not fully justified by these concerns. These practices could amount to an outright exclusion of ex-offenders that are not fully justified by the
public interest and therefore should be further examined.
I argue that we can move beyond this potential policy challenge and enhance the employability of both ex-offenders and
black men by reexamining legal requirements that guide criminal background checking and by focusing on risk to employers of
hiring ex-offenders. Softening employers' negative attitudes towards ex-offenders would also help achieve these goals.
To accomplish this well, public policy should first aim to
achieve the following:
1) Re-examine Federal, State, and Local Employment/Licensing Restrictions.The results of this study show that
legal requirements to check are the main drivers of the negative
effect of criminal background checks on hiring ex-offenders. A
central concern in this regard is whether the legal mandates to
check are in fact consistent with and true to actual business necessity provisions that provide the legal justification for states to
impose these requirements. Thus, statutes that require criminal
background checks, or that exclude ex-offenders from employment licensing or employment should be reviewed. Where possible, consistent criteria should be adopted and universally applied. The criteria should be appropriate for the class of jobs that
fall under these restrictions. Such a review could help uncover
those statutes that may overreach in restricting these opportunities given the public interest involved.
A central problem concerning the exact employment issues
confronting ex-offenders and society is not resolved by the data
used or the results presented in this Article. Although the results
are clear that criminal background checks-especially those that
follow from legal mandates-decrease employment opportunities
for ex-offenders, it is not clear whether the ex-offenders not hired
would be better (that is, more qualified in a skills sense) employees than those applicants who were hired. If ex-offenders
94 See After Prison:Roadblocks to Reentry at 10 (cited in note 26).
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would in fact be better employees, firms would be harmed by lost
productivity. Society would also be harmed as a result of additional costs imposed as a consequence of problems relating to
joblessness, such as potential social program costs or crime and
recidivism costs, etc. On the other hand, if ex-offenders would not
be better employees, private firms would benefit through productivity gains, but society would still be harmed in a similar fashion as before.
The data and results presented here do not indicate whether
employers are accurate in their assessment of the overall skill
sets of men with records. However, if employers are generally
accurate in their decision making in this regard, then the larger
employment concerns would be within the scope of criminal law
(that is, more extensive enforcement policies or more intensive
punishments create more ex-offenders that in turn hurts the labor force) or with economics (that is, lower employment and income for men with records who cannot get jobs makes crime
more appealing than the formal job market) more generally.
Consistent with this reasoning, increasing skill sets through job
training and labor market intermediaries, as well as promoting
record expungement, should be considered.
2) Increase Skills / Work Experience Before and After Release.
Providing education and training for those incarcerated, including (but not limited to) obtaining GEDs, can be helpful when offenders are ultimately released and seek employment. Increasing
their work experience while they are incarcerated should also
produce payoffs. One way of doing so is to make it easier for private sector employers in California to hire prisoners while they
are still incarcerated. Pre-release placement activities and planning also help smooth the transition. Subsidizing short-term
"transitional jobs" for those released could be an important way
of providing them with some solid work experience while indicating to employers that they are job-ready.
3) Record Expungement. Common sense record expungement
should be considered as well. As noted earlier, risk assessments
show that not all ex-offenders are equally at risk for re-offending.
Desistence from crime is a common characteristic for men over
twenty-seven years of age. To the extent that such men with
records desist from crime, record expungement for those who
have been "clean" for a specified period of time might be considered. Standing alone, such expungement policies could serve as
a powerful incentive to desist from crime as well. To the extent
that record expungement is seriously considered, efforts should
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also be made to ensure accuracy of records, especially from those
sources accessed by private methods.
4) Promote Role of Labor Market Intermediaries.Intermediaries might provide important vouching services to employers as
well as case management services to the offenders themselves, to
overcome the many barriers they face in finding jobs-such as
limited skills and work experience, residence in poor neighborhoods that limit access to employers and to networks, substance
abuse problems, etc. To the extent that employers have good experiences in working with intermediaries, trust will increase,
thereby allowing them to credibly vouch for ex-offenders, resulting in increased employability.
Intermediaries can also reach out to employers and try to
place those ex-offenders who meet certain levels of employmentreadiness into jobs appropriate for them. The information that
they provide to employers at this stage about the qualities of the
job applicants, and about their experiences since release, can be
crucial. Supportive services, including transportation and postemployment counseling, can also be provided once the "match"
with an employer has been made. As such, intermediaries can
also help bridge the spatial gap between where ex-offenders and
appropriate job opportunities are located.
Indeed, labor market intermediaries might well play an important role bridging gaps between employers and disadvantaged
men more broadly, even for those who are not ex-offenders.
On the other hand, to the extent that employers are inaccurate in their decision making concerning the productiveness of
ex-offenders, the source of these inaccuracies would stem from
either a lack of information or irrational biases. Moreover, market forces will be unlikely to correct these biases-through competing firms hiring these lower costs workers thereby improving
their competitiveness-since legal questions concerning their
hiring will be difficult to overcome. Promoting more and better
information about ex-offenders from background checking and
increasing enforcement of existing employment laws would help
address these concerns.
5) Provide More Information about Ex-Offenders. An approach including information about the exact nature of the offense (that is, whether it was a non-violent drug offense or something else), when it occurred, and the individual's record might
help soften employers' negative attitudes toward ex-offenders.
For example, evidence suggests less employer aversion to hiring
those who have only been convicted of non-violent drug offenses
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or property crimes as opposed to violent crimes. 95 To the extent
that offenders may have engaged in more positive activities, including training or employment, during their time of incarceration and especially since their release, this additional information might be particularly useful in overcoming employer reluctance to hire them as well.
6) Promote Accurate Criminal Background Checks. Employers have grown more willing to engage in criminal background
checks as the internet makes it easier and cheaper to do so. This
could improve the employment prospects of black men more
broadly, even while it makes it more difficult for those who have
truly been offenders in the past.
However, to the extent that employers have more information about criminal backgrounds, it is critically important that
the information be accurate. This information should also be limited to conviction information, since arrests may not lead to
convictions. For instance, private providers of criminal background information to employers do not always distinguish arrest
from conviction information, though only the latter should inform
employer decisions, and even the conviction information might
have errors. Arrest records (especially when they do not lead to
conviction) are much noisier signals of propensity for criminality
because they also reflect policing and enforcement strategies that
could be influenced by racial considerations.
7) Enhance Antidiscrimination Enforcement. Of course
greater enforcement of antidiscrimination laws should be pursued as well. However, monitoring may be difficult since research suggests that much of the statistical discrimination
against black men on the basis of perceived criminality or
against ex-offenders occurs in smaller firms that are exempt
from EEOC regulations.
Directly lowering the risk to employers of hiring ex-offenders
would help in this regard as well, in addition to potentially reducing reliance on statistical discrimination in hiring on the basis of perceived criminality. This could be accomplished by enhancing bonding.
8) Indemnify Employers by Promoting Bonding. Bonds are
currently available at low cost to insure employers against the
financial liabilities that they might incur from hiring exoffenders. But such bonds are extremely underutilized by em95 See Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, The Effect of an Applicant's Criminal History on
Employer Hiring Decisions and Screening Practices at 128 (cited in note 9).
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ployers at the moment, even though many employers indicate
legal liabilities among their greatest concerns when hiring from
this population.9 6 An outreach effort to increase employer awareness of bonds, and to make them more easily available to employers, should be undertaken. The value of the bonds, currently
set at $5 thousand, 97 might need to be increased as well in order
to be considered effective insurance. This might also increase
bond purchase rates.
Together, successful pursuit and implementation of these
policy ideas are likely to lead to both increased hiring of exoffenders and of black men more generally.

96

Holzer, Collateral Costs (cited in note 8).

9' Information about the U.S. Department of Labor's Federal Bonding Program is

available at <http://www.bonds4jobs.com/assetsbrochure.pdf> (last visited Mar 18, 2009).
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FIGURE 1
Proportion of Firms that Check Backgrounds, 1992-94 & 2001
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FIGURE 2
Proportion of Employers who Indicate Legal
Requirement to Check
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FIGURE 3
Predicted Means in Hiring Ex-Offenders by Whether and How
Employers Check Criminal Background of Applicants
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* indicates statistically significantly different than Does Not Check at at least the 5 percent level.

FIGURE 4
Regression Estimates Predicting Difference in Hiring for Firms
that Check and Don't Check Criminal Backgrounds
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FIGURE 5
Regression Estimates Predicting Percent of Last Hires who are
Black Men: Model Estimates by Checking Status of Firm and
Employer Willingness to Hire Ex-Offenders
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FIGURE 6
Regression Estimates Predicting Percent of Last Hires who are
Black Men: Model Estimates by Educational Attainment and
Checking Status of Firm
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FIGURE 7
Regression Estimates Predicting Percent of Last Hires who are
Black Men: Legal Requirement to Check Status and Method of
Checking
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TABLE A. 1
Means (Standard Deviations) of Firm Characteristics and
Employer Attitude Variables
(1)
All Firms

(2)
Checks
Criminal
Background

(3)
Does not
Check Criminal Background

0.014
(0.087)

0.004
(0.012)

0.021
(0.116)

Check with Criminal
Justice Agencies

0.141
(0.344)

0.368
(0.483)

0.017
(0.131)

Check with Private
Sources

0.187
(0.391)

0.491
(0.501)

0.023
(0.151)

Other Checking
Methods

0.120
(0.164)

0.140
(0.257)

0.000
(0.000)

Manufacturing

0.171
(0.377)

0.127
(0.334)

0.206
(0.405)

Retail

0.185
(0.389)
0.435
(0.496)
0.034
(0.181)

0.193
(0.395)
0.498
(0.501)
0.022
(0.146)

0.180
(0.385)
0.384
(0.487)
0.044
(0.205)

0.053
(0.224)

0.062
(0.241)

0.047
(0.211)

Ex-Offender Hiring
Outcomes
Percent of Jobs Filled
in Past Year
Other Checking
Characteristics
Method

Firm Characteristics
Industry

Service
Construction
Trans., Comm., and
Utilities

(table continues)
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Table A.1 Cont'd
(1)
All Firms

(2)
Checks
Criminal
Background

(3)
Does not Check
Criminal Background

0.172
(0.377)
0.422
(0.494)

0.081
(0.274)
0.396
(0.490)

0.244
(0.430)
0.443
(0.498)

0.405
(0.491)

0.522
(0.500)

0.313
(0.464)

0.000

0.560
(0.497)

0.444
(0.498)

0.653
(0.477)

0.001-0.040

0.235
(0.424)

0.300
(0.459)

0.183
(0.387)

> 0.040

0.205
(0.404)

0.256
(0.437)

0.165
(0.371)

0.000

0.221
(0.415)

0.247
(0.432)

0.201
(0.401)

0.001-0.200

0.237
(0.426)
0.540
(0.499)
0.263
(0.441)

0.236
(0.426)
0.516
(0.501)
0.255
(0.436)

0.238
(0.427)
0.558
(0.497)
0.270
(0.445)

Collective Bargaining

0.240
(0.428)

0.317
(0.466)

0.180
(0.384)

Not-for-Profit

0.213
(0.410)

0.313
(0.464)

0.134
(0.341)

Minority-Owned

0.216
(0.412)

0.160
(0.367)

0.262
(0.440)

Black Female
Applicants

0.073
(0.143)

0.094
(0.168)

0.056
(0.116)

Firm Size
1-19
20-99
100+
Vacancy Rate

% Jobs Unskilled

> 0.200
Central City

(table continues)
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Table A. 1 Cont'd
(1)
All Firms

(2)
Checks
Criminal
Background

Black Male Applicants

0.089
(0.159)

0.109
(0.178)

(3)
Does not
Check Criminal Background
0.073
(0.141)

Latino Applicants

0.338
(0.346)

0.314
(0.328)

0.358
(0.360)

Willing to Hire

0.197
(0.398)

0.127
(0.334)

0.253
(0.435)

Depends on Crime

0.341
(0.474)

0.407
(0.492)

0.288
(0.453)

Unwilling to Hire

0.399
(0.490)

0.389
(0.488)

0.407
(0.492)

604

268

336

Willingness to Hire

Last Hire-White
Last Hire-Black Male
Last Hire-Black Female
Last Hire-Latino
N

Fiw&

